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1. upon reading through A Treatise of Human Nature, what is immedi-
ately manifest is that sympathy plays the leading role in hume’s enterprise 
of presenting a non-rationalist, sentimental-based comprehensive theory of 
human nature. The communal character of those belonging to the same na-
tion1, our «love of relations»2, our «esteem for the rich and powerful»3, our 
feelings of compassion, pity, malice, and envy4; all these human phenomena 
are explained by hume as the direct product of sympathy. if we human be-
ings were not capable of sympathising with one another, our own mental 
condition would deteriorate5; without sympathy, we would not be able to 
voice our sense of beauty6. most importantly, without sympathy we would 
not be capable of judging morally. Framed by hume as a key principle, mak-
ing the sentimental transmission among human beings intelligible, «sym-
pathy is the chief source of moral distinctions»7, and guarantees a power-
ful philosophical device to account for a public and intersubjective ethics. 
it is on account of sympathy, in fact, that we are able to praise as virtues 
those qualities of character which are agreeable to ourselves or to others 
(and despise as vices those which are not)8, and also to approve of those ar-
tificial virtues of justice, fidelity to promises and allegiance to rulers, thanks 
to «a sympathy with public interest»9. There are strong reasons to believe 
that hume never rejected sympathy as an essential pillar of his philosophical 
1 See T 2.1.11.2; SBn 316-317.
2 T, 2.2.4.
3 T, 2.2.5.
4 T, T 2.2.7-8.
5 T, 2.2.5.15; SBn 363.
6 T, 3.3.6.1; SBn 618.
7 T, 3.3.6.1; SBn 618.
8 T, 3.3.1.30; SBn 591.
9 T, 3.2.2.24; SBn 499-500, italics in original, and 3.2.8.7; SBn 545-46.
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system (even though scholars disagree on this issue), but upheld it in his later 
works as well10. What is more, humean sympathy is still at the centre of the 
present-day moral debate, and is explicitly recognised in many contempo-
rary versions of sentimentalism and of the ethics of care as the direct source 
for that notion of ‘empathy’ on which they are based11. nonetheless, this 
re-evaluation of humean sympathy is in danger of producing unfortunate 
repercussions. There is a line of interpretation which sees hume’s account 
of morality as having in itself the seeds of its own failure, precisely because 
it hinges upon the principle of sympathy. Far from guaranteeing any form of 
interconnection among people whatsoever, the very principle of sympathy 
would bind hume to conceive individuals as inescapably independent and 
isolated from one another, thus disclosing the solipsistic essence of his phe-
nomenalist perspective, and in turn the failure of his sentimentalist ethical 
project in all its evidence.
in what follows i shall discuss hume’s principle of sympathy in the light 
of this criticism, and argue that it is widely off the mark. i shall begin by 
presenting a brief reconstruction of the theoretical passages which would 
purportedly prove the internal fallacy of hume’s principle of sympathy. This 
fallacy, the argument goes, is due to cartesian presuppositions internal to 
hume’s empiricism, and becomes awkwardly apparent when sympathy is 
explained in inferential terms on the strength of an argument based on anal-
ogy. i intend to show that the argument from analogy is not the correct way 
to present the workings of sympathy, and that hume’s text allows for an 
explanation of sympathy as a form of sentimental transmission between in-
10 See K. abramson, Sympathy and the Project of Hume’s Second Enquiry, «archiv für 
Geschichte der philosophie» LXXXiii (2000), pp. 45-80; a. c. Baier and a. Waldow, A 
Conversation between Annette Baier and Anik Waldow about Hume’s Account of Sympathy, 
«hume Studies», XXXiv (2008), 1, pp. 61-87; n. capaldi, Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy, 
new york, peter Lang, 1992, pp. 241-248; r. Debes, Humanity, Sympathy, and the Puzzle of 
Hume’s Second Enquiry, «British Journal for the history of philosophy», Xv (2007), pp. 
27-57, and Has Anything Changed? Hume’s Theory of Association and Sympathy After the 
Treatise, «British Journal for the history of philosophy», Xv (2007), pp. 313-338; J. Taylor, 
Hume on the Standard of Virtue, «The Journal of ethics», vi (2002), pp. 43-62, and Hume’s 
Later Moral Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edition, edited by D. F. 
norton – J. Taylor, cambridge, cambridge university press, 2009, pp. 311-340; r. vitz, Sym-
pathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology, «Journal of the history of philosophy», 
XLii (2004), pp. 261-275.
11 See m. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London-new york, routledge, 2007, 
and Moral Sentimentalism, oxford-new york, oxford university press, 2010. See also J. 
c. Tronto, Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, London-new york, 
routledge, 1993. 
195The Force oF SympaThy in The eThicS oF DaviD hume
dividuals which operates in a direct and unmediated way. i maintain, that is, 
that hume successfully accounted for the sentimental exchange among in-
dividual human beings by way of sympathy, and that this exchange provides 
the shared context within which a communal morality may be established 
and developed. as a close to this main contention, i shall finally conclude 
by stressing the fundamental role played by sympathy within hume’s phi-
losophy in clarifying to ourselves the passions we have. This allows us to 
contribute to the definition of our own self from a sentimental perspective 
via the passions of pride and humility, and to provide the basis for hume’s 
sentiment-based ethical individualism.
2. The attack on humean sympathy has its theoretical roots in Thomas 
reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense12, 
and, through that exegesis which goes under the name of ‘reid-Beattie in-
terpretation’13, has been preserved up to the 20th century. From the point of 
view of the ‘reid-Beattie interpretation’ the importance of hume’s philoso-
phy is that of having brought empiricism to its extreme consequences, lead-
ing it to inevitable sceptical conclusions. clearly exposed by T. h. Green in 
his General Introduction to the works of hume14, this line of thought has been 
embraced, more or less explicitly and self-consciously, by a variety of inter-
preters. The result is that the humean empirical stance has been considered 
in modern times as a form of phenomenalism15 opening up, on the one hand, 
12 See T. reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense 
[1764], edited by D. r. Brookes, university park, pennsylvania, The pennsylvania State uni-
versity press, 1997. 
13 See n. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume. A Critical Study of Its Origins and 
Central Doctrines, London, macmillan, 1949, pp. 3 ff. on the ‘reid-Beattie interpretation’, 
see G. Bonino, T. H. Green e il mito dell’empirismo britannico, Firenze, Leo S. olschki, 2003, 
chs. 1 and 6, and La leggenda storiografica di Hume, «rivista di filosofia», LXXXvii (1996), 
pp. 241-265. See also S. Bucchi, Hume, i Mill e la «Reid-Beattie Interpretation», «rivista di 
filosofia», LXXXiX (1998), pp. 139-154, and L. Turco, Hume e le leggende storiografiche, 
«Discipline filosofiche», vi (1996), pp. 261-282. For an examination of the continuity that 
the ‘reid-Beattie interpretation’ has had until nowadays, in particular concerning hume’s 
theory of the passions, see n. capaldi, Hume’s Theory of the Passions, in David Hume. Criti-
cal Assessments, edited by S. Tweyman, vol. iv, London-new york, routledge, 1995, pp. 
249-270.
14 T. h. Green, General Introduction [1874-75], in The Philosophical Works of David 
Hume, [1886] 4 vols., anastatic reprint, aalen, Scentia verlag, 1964. 
15 See e. g. D. m. armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, London, routledge & 
Kegan paul, 1961; J. Laird, Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, London, methuen, 1932; 
h. h. price, Hume’s Theory of External World, oxford, clarendon press, 1940; F. Zabeeh, 
Hume. Precursor of Modern Empiricism, The hague, martinus nijhoff, 19732. 
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to forms of solipsism16, and, on the other, to extreme versions of ethical emo-
tivism17. under the ‘reid-Beattie interpretation’ hume shares a fundamental 
feature with all the exponents of the empiricist tradition: that of being, willy-
nilly, a follower of Descartes. That cartesian philosophy influenced hume’s 
is hardly disputable18; nonetheless, some have remarked that this cartesian 
heritage definitely amounts to far more than a plain influence19. Like Locke’s 
and Berkeley’s, and also malebranche’s, hume’s philosophy would indeed 
be nothing other than a variant of a common «cartesian System»20, the ac-
ceptance of which would imply a whole chain of consequences and eventu-
16 See e. g. a. J. ayer, One’s Knowledge of Other Minds, in Ayer, Philosophical Essays, 
London, macmillan, 1954, pp. 191-214, and The Problem of Knowledge, harmondsworth, 
penguin, 1956; B. russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, chicago-London, The 
open court publishing company, 1914. For a comparative analysis of humean empiricism 
and modern Logical empiricism, see D. pears, Hume’s Empiricism and Modern Empiricism, 
in David Hume. A Symposium, edited by D. pears, London, macmillan, 1963, pp. 11-30. 
notice that hume has been read under the light of the ‘read-Beattie interpretation’ also by 
the exponents of a tradition that stands at the opposite from neopositivism, represented by 
those who take the work of Wilfrid Sellars as one of their points of reference. See e. g. r. 
rorty, Should Hume Be Answered or Bypassed?, in Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Es-
says Presented to Marjorie Grene, edited by a. Donagan – a. n. perovich, Jr. – m. v. Wedin, 
Dordrecht, D. reidel, 1986, pp. 341-352.
17 For the relation between hume and modern emotivism, see a. J. ayer, Hume, oxford-
new york, oxford university press, 1980, ch. 5; r. cohon, Hume’s Morality. Feeling and 
Fabrication, oxford-new york, oxford university press, 2008, pp. 97-98; m. Johnson, Moral 
Imagination. Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics, chicago-London, The university of 
chicago press, 1993, pp. 134-141; e. Lecaldano, Hume e la nascita dell’etica contemporanea, 
roma-Bari, Laterza, 1991, ch. 6, esp. pp. 252-253; J. o. urmson, The Emotive Theory of Eth-
ics, London, hutchinson university Library, 1968, ch. 2.
18 See e. c. mossner, The Life of David Hume, oxford, clarendon press, 19802, ch. 8.
19 on the cartesian interpretation of hume, see e. g. a. Kenny, Action, Emotion and 
Will, London, routledge and Kegan paul, 1963, ch. 1 and Cartesian Privacy, in Wittgenstein. 
The Philosophical Investigations, edited by G. pitcher, London, macmillan, 1968, pp. 352-370; 
p. mercer, Sympathy and Ethics. A Study of the Relationship Between Sympathy and Morality 
with Special Reference to Hume’s Treatise, oxford, clarendon press, 1972, ch. 2; J. passmore, 
Hume’s Intentions, London, Duckworth, 19803, pp. 13-14; D. pears, Hume’s Recantation of 
His Theory of Personal Identity, «hume Studies», XXX (2004), pp. 257-264; T. penelhum, 
David Hume. An Introduction to His Philosophical System, West Lafayette, indiana, purdue 
university press, 1992, p. 23.
20 reid writes, «The system which is now generally received, with regard to the mind 
and its operations, derives not only its spirit from Des cartes, but its fundamental principles; 
and after all the improvements made by malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and hume, may still 
be called the cartesian System: we shall therefore make some remarks upon its spirit and 
tendency in general, and upon its doctrine concerning ideas in particular». reid, An Inquiry 
into the Human Mind, ch. 7, p. 208.
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ally lead to solipsistic conclusions, when applied to the sentimental sphere 
as hume describes it. as with the other British empiricists, for hume as 
well – so the story goes – all perceptions (of the external world rather than 
of our internal states, of original impressions rather than ideas) are equally, 
qua perceptions, mental states. as such, they are the only things we can know 
for sure, and about which we cannot be wrong. We may well be unsure that 
our perceptions have any correspondence with the external world, or we may 
have a perception which is in fact illusory (for example a hallucination or a vi-
sion), but in both cases we cannot deceive ourselves about the fact that we are 
having a perception; that is to say, we cannot have non-conscious perceptions. 
in turn, the nature of human knowledge is that of being knowledge only of 
mental contents, and its limits consist only of those elements which are pres-
ent to the mind – a conviction which constitutes the core of what is commonly 
known as the ‘way of ideas’21. But once the ‘way of ideas’ is in place, the in-
evitable consequence is a «primacy of the private», whereby our perceptions 
consist in mental states (virtually mental images) which are internal and in 
principle accessible only by the person who has them22. 
3. This line of thinking, when applied to what hume says about pas-
sions, undermines both his sentimentalism, and the idea that morality can be 
based on sentimental grounds. hume does, as a matter of fact, identify pas-
sions and emotions with perceptions, and these, as such, correspond to par-
ticular experiences, directly observable only by the person who feels them23; 
patently, then, the human mind we experience appears to be only our own, 
not other people’s. Like Descartes, he has the problem of explaining how it is 
that we can go beyond our own mental representations and recognise others, 
not as bare bodies, but as sentimentally characterised persons24. We are not 
able to know the mental states of other persons, and since we have no access 
to the contents of other minds, it would seem that we can never be sure that 
21 on the ‘way of ideas’, with particular reference to Descartes and reid, see e. Levi 
mortera, Reid, Descartes e la «way of Ideas», in Dal cartesianismo all’illuminismo radicale, 
edited by c. Borghero – c. Buccolini, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010, pp. 103-125.
22 a. Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief, London, routledge and Kegan paul, 1961, pp. 
37. See also Flew, Another Idea of Necessary Connection, «philosophy», Lvii (1982), pp. 487-
494 and David Hume. Philosopher of Moral Science, oxford, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 12-37. 
23 See T 1.1.1.
24 See a. e. pitson, both Sympathy and Other Selves, «hume Studies», XXii (1996), pp. 
255-271, and Hume’s Philosophy of the Self, London-new york, routledge, 2002, ch. 8. For a 
discussion of pitson, see a. Waldow, David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds, London-
new york, continuum, 2009, pp. 73-79.
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we have before us other human beings that have thoughts and sentiments, 
instead of empty shells, zombies or robots25.
in a context of this kind, however, hume nonetheless appears to deem 
it possible to conclude indirectly that these thoughts and sentiments exist, 
even though access to other states of mind is precluded26. as the argument 
runs, having the experience of an emotion means recognising or perceiving 
an internal mental state to which only the person experiencing it has ac-
cess; a person’s behaviour, verbal or otherwise, is therefore to be regarded 
as the external symptom of an internal event. if this were true, an observer 
could then infer the existence of an emotion from its external effects. Thus, 
statements describing psychological states in the first person are accounts of 
introspective observations, whilst statements describing psychological states 
in the third person are products of inferences – they are result of an induc-
tive argument whereby, moving from a person’s deportment, one arrives at 
presuppositions concerning his or her corresponding internal mental states. 
The only possibility we have of recognising the mental states of others would 
seem to depend, then, on an argument by analogy27, through which we are 
25 For a classical formulation of this problem in these terms, see n. malcolm, Problems 
of Mind. Descartes to Wittgenstein, London, allen and unwin, 1972, ch. 1, secs. 6 to 8; and 
Knowledge of Other Minds, «Journal of philosophy», Lv (1958), pp. 969-978. For a more gen-
eral analysis of the problem of other minds, see a. avramides, Other Minds, London-new 
york, routledge, 2001. See also B. Brewer, Emotion and Other Minds, and D. hutto, The World 
is Not enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds, both in Understanding Emotions. Mind and 
Morals, edited by p. Goldie, aldershot-Burlington, ashgate, 2002, pp. 23-36, 37-53; h. pick-
ard, Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds, in Philosophy and the Emotions, edited by a. 
hatzimoysis, cambridge, cambridge university press, 2003 (royal institute of philosophy 
Supplement, 52), pp. 87-104. on hume’s belief in other minds, see a. Waldow, Hume’s Belief 
in Other Minds, «British Journal for the history of philosophy», Xvii (2009), 1, pp. 119-132, 
and Waldow, David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. 
26 See mercer, Sympathy and Ethics, ch. 2.
27 reid writes: «But the anatomist of the mind cannot have the same advantage. it is his own 
mind only that he can examine, with any degree of accuracy and distinctness. This is the only 
subject he can look into. he may, from outward signs, collect the operations of other minds; 
but these signs are for the most part ambiguous, and must be interpreted by what he perceives 
within himself». reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, ch. 1, p. 13. one of the best examples 
of the argument by analogy is given by John Stuart mill in his An Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton’s Philosophy. See J. S. mill, collected Works, edited by J. m. robson, vol. iX, Toronto, 
university of Toronto press, London, routledge & Kegan paul, 1979, pp. 190-191. note that 
mill’s interpretation of hume is not all that far from the ‘reid-Beattie interpretation’. in fact, 
according to mill, hume may be considered «the profoundest negative thinker on record». J. 
S. mill, Bentham, in Collected Works, edited by J. m. robson, vol. X, Toronto, university of 
Toronto press, London, routledge & Kegan paul, 1985, p. 80. on the argument by analogy in 
hume, see pitson, Sympathy and Other Selves, and Hume’s Philosophy of the Self, ch. 8.
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authorised to ascribe mental states to others only on the basis of the anal-
ogy between their visible behaviour and what we ourselves feel when we are 
aware of having certain mental states. Since we behave in certain ways when 
we have particular mental states, by observing the same behaviour in others, 
we suppose that they too have the same mental states. in this way, based on 
the experience we have of our internal mental states and consequent exter-
nal behaviour, we move on to inferring that other people are also individuals 
characterised by the same passions as ourselves.
Sympathy is adduced by hume as the explanatory principle for how emo-
tive communication is possible28: a process consisting in the transformation 
of a lively idea into an impression. Whenever we witness the expression of 
another person’s passion, emotion, or sentiment, this will present itself to 
our mind as a lively idea. When this idea is compared to the idea we have of 
ourselves, a new passion, emotion or sentiment is generated in us – one that 
corresponds to that of the person before us. in this way, hume ostensibly 
says, human beings influence each other reciprocally, and are thus able to 
establish contact at the sentimental level. This emotive contagion29 occurs 
in an involuntary and automatic manner, and is «an object of the plainest 
experience, and depends not on any hypothesis of philosophy»30.
Still, given the cartesian presuppositions mentioned above, sympathy can 
hardly accomplish the task it is assigned. in fact, if the argument by analogy 
were to hold, the supposed interpenetration of sentiments with the person be-
fore us would be merely illusory; we would never really come into contact with 
these sentiments, but only with the idea we form of them – that is to say, with 
a personal psychological state of our own. The transformation of the idea that 
we have of impressions experienced by others into impressions of our own 
could in no way correspond to our experiencing their discomfort or pleasure: 
it would rather be a matter of our reacting emotionally in a certain way. The 
case can be argued that this overall reading has nothing to do with the com-
munication that hume speaks of. To illustrate the problems this construal 
gives rise to, we might observe how, in the instance of a person being faced 
28 See T 2.1.11.
29 T, 3.3.3.5; SBn 605.
30 T, 2.1.11.8; SBn 319-320. in this sense, as many have underlined, sympathy is not in 
turn a passion, but rather a principle that explains how the passions can be communicated. 
See Lecaldano, Hume e la nascita dell’etica contemporanea, pp. 97-98; mercer, Sympathy and 
Ethics, ch. 2; pitson, Sympathy and Other Selves; B. Wand, A Note on Sympathy in Hume’s 
Moral Theory, in David Hume. Critical Assessments, vol. iv, pp. 477-481. on the contrary, D. 
G. c. macnabb, David Hume. His Theory of Knowledge and Morality, oxford, Blackwell, 
1966, pp. 166, maintains the opposite. 
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with the expression of anxiety on somebody else’s part, this transformation 
would abolish the distinction between that which is being anxious and that 
which is experiencing sympathy for the person who is anxious. if sympathy 
were nothing but a cognitive operation by which we move from our own ex-
perience in order to infer the passions of others, then indeed we would never 
come out of ourselves. What we experience would only be private emotional 
responses that do not reflect the passions of others, but are merely provoked 
by them. all that the principle of sympathy would be capable of explaining 
is that human beings react mechanically to the expression of the passions in 
other human beings. if this were so, it would be right to say that sympathy 
is a mere contagion, but certainly not that «imaginative projection into the 
other’s situation»31 which allows us to feel the sentiments of others in the 
first person; to become conscious, that is, of their condition, and therefore of 
their presence as persons. on this view, the mechanism elaborated to account 
for the fact that human beings are able to go beyond themselves in the end 
turns back on itself, functioning instead as a further proof of the substantial 
solitude in which hume’s sentimental individual is forced to remain, barely 
able to recognise the very thing that provides proof of his or her selfhood32.
4. is this account of the functioning of sympathy correct, and does hume 
really fail in his attempt to show how it is that human beings are capable 
of emotional communication? in order to answer these questions, a closer 
look at the mechanisms of humean sympathy is in order. What immediately 
ought to give pause is the point in the Treatise at which hume introduces the 
concept: namely, the part he devotes to the discussion of the passions of pride 
and humility33. among the causes of pride and humility, hume reminds us, 
the most disparate can be recognised, and we give great importance to all of 
them; but if they were not sustained by the opinions of others little weight 
would be given to them. The discussion of sympathy arises precisely at the 
point at which sympathy, pride, and humility are seen to be closely linked, 
and from the examination of this conjuncture a different interpretation of 
sympathy from that presented above emerges. 
«no quality of human nature», hume says, «is more remarkable, both in 
itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize 
31 G. J. postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities”: Sympathy and Comparison in 
Hume’s Moral Psychology, «hume Studies», XXXi (2005), pp. 249-298, quotation p. 259.
32 Besides mercer and Flew, see J. harrison, Hume’s Moral Epistemology, clarendon 
press, oxford, 1976, pp. 105-110; Johnson, Moral Imagination, pp. 135-136; J. neu, Emotion, 
Thought and Therapy, Berkeley-Los angeles, university of california press, 1977, pp. 46-53.
33 See T 2.1.11.
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with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and senti-
ments, however different from, or even opposite to our own»34. To see a 
cheerful face gives one a sense of serenity, while an angry or gloomy one will 
dampen one’s spirits; and he goes on, «hatred, resentment, esteem, love, 
courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions i feel more from commu-
nication than from my own natural temper and disposition»35. it has already 
been noted that sympathy is the medium through which the idea of another’s 
affective experience is first communicated to us by way of its external signs 
in the behaviour and in the conversation of the other. This idea is therefore 
immediately converted into an impression, thus acquiring such a degree of 
strength and liveliness that it becomes the passion itself, and produces an 
emotion equal to that of the original36. hume’s explanation of how this is 
possible is analogous to the double relation of impressions and ideas under-
lying the formation of the impressions of pride and humility, and of love and 
hate. The idea of another’s emotion mutates into an emotion of our own – 
i.e., an idea mutates into an impression when it is brought into relation with 
«the idea, or rather impression of ourselves [that] is always intimately present 
with us»37. Self-consciousness is so lively as to charge everything that comes 
into contact with it with a similar vivacity. This passage of liveliness, that 
transforms the idea into the corresponding impression, is ensured by the 
three relations of resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect.
What one has in sympathy, therefore, is the conversion of an idea into 
an impression that is brought about by the relation that the relevant objects 
have with that self that is always intimately present to ourselves. now, it is 
true that hume says that «by an inference from cause and effect, and by the 
observation of external signs, we are inform’d of the real existence of the 
object, which is resembling or contiguous»38; and again at a later point, «no 
passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only 
sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: and conse-
quently these give rise to our sympathy»39. nonetheless, this doesn’t amount 
to his saying that the mechanism of sympathy functions on the basis of the 
argument by analogy. The fact that hume explains the dynamic of sympathy 
by reference to the «communication» of the passions between one individual 
and another suggests that this consists, not so much in an operation in which 
34 T, 2.1.11.2; SBn 316.
35 T, 2.1.11.3; SBn 317.
36 Ibidem.
37 T 2.1.11.4; SBn 317.
38 T, 2.1.11.4; SBn 317-318.
39 T, 3.3.1.7; SBn 576, italics in original.
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we know the mental states of others on the grounds of our knowledge of our 
own personal mental states, as in a kind of sentimental transmission, that 
works in the same way as the motion from one object to another. hume is 
clear on this:
The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be 
actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. 
as in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; 
so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspond-
ing movements in every human creature. When i see the effects of passion in the 
voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to 
their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted 
into the passion itself. in like manner, when i perceive the causes of any emotion, my 
mind is convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion40.
Just as the chords of an instrument that, without being touched, vibrate 
in sympathy, repeating the movement of those that have been plucked, in the 
same way human beings echo, through sympathy, the sentimental expres-
sions of those they relate to41. 
5. in its fuller formulation, therefore, hume speaks not of an explicit, 
conscious procedure whereby we derive the notion of other people’s mental 
states from their visible behaviour; rather, he describes a response mechanism 
that is natural and inevitable, an effect of the make-up of human nature. The 
mechanism, thus, is fully instinctual and structured in such a way that indi-
viduals reciprocally interpenetrate each other’s sentiments as they come into 
contact. Granted that hume does mention inference, the phenomenology of 
sympathy doesn’t appear to be the phenomenology of an inference. nor does 
sympathy correspond to a rationalisation in the form of a conscious grasp 
of connecting inference propositions; and so little has the phenomenon of 
sympathy to do for hume with explicit conscious processes that it is even 
shared with other animals42. Those who embrace a ‘cartesian’ interpretation 
40 T, 3.3.1.7; SBn 575-576, italics in original.
41 on the origin of the term ‘sympathy’ as vibration or resonance, that is, sympathy 
with, not sympathy for, see i. hacking, On Sympathy: With Other Creatures, «Tijdschrift voor 
Filosofie», LXiii, (2001), pp. 685-717. 
42 See T 2.2.12.5-6; SBn 398. on similarities in hume between animal and human na-
ture, see a. c. Baier, Acting in Character, in Baier, Death and Character. Further Reflections 
on Hume, cambridge, mass.-London, harvard university press, 2008, pp. 3-21, esp. p. 13; 
T. L. Beauchamp, Hume on the Nonhuman Animal, «Journal of medicine and philosophy», 
XXiv (1999), pp. 322-335. on the capacity to extend sympathy to non-human animals, see 
D. Boyle, Hume on Animal Reason, «hume Studies», XXiX (2003), pp. 3-28; pitson, Hume’s 
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of hume maintain that his explanation of sympathy is incorrect because we 
lack any direct access to that core of passions in other individuals, knowl-
edge of which is therefore precluded. only such access would allow us, on 
their view, to conceive of others as fellow human beings. however, in the 
humean system, it is not the business of sympathy to explain how it is that 
we indirectly come know the content of other minds, through the observa-
tion of the visible behaviour of others. on the contrary, the role of sympathy 
is to account for that characteristic of human nature through which we are 
able to recognise each other directly as similar. in this light what hume says 
about the substantial resemblance of human beings acquires meaning:
now ’tis obvious, that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human 
creatures, and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in 
some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same 
with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. however the parts may differ 
in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is 
a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety; and 
this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of 
others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure43.
This background resemblance is a «fact» which is automatically felt by 
human beings44, as if it were «infused over our minds»45. it imposes itself 
without being the result of any conscious reasoning. Far from consisting in 
a transition from what is present in us to the attribution of mental states to 
others, humean sympathy shows itself to be an explanatory instrument that 
owes its theoretical success to the efficacy with which it accounts for the fact 
that human beings are sensitive, at a purely sentimental level, to the emo-
tions of others. 
When hume’s terminology resembles the language of the ‘way of ideas’, 
this is mainly due to his newtonian aspiration of presenting a theory of hu-
man nature founded on as few principles as possible, and in which both 
the phenomena of the understanding and those of the passions have to be 
explained by means of a structural analogy between the workings of belief 
and of sympathy46. nonetheless, not only this desire for theoretical simplicity 
has not to be confused with an endorsement on hume’s behalf of the ‘way 
Philosophy of the Self, ch. 7 and The Nature of Human Animals, «hume Studies», XiX (1993), 
pp. 301-316.
43 T 2.1.11.5; SBn 318.
44 See r. hardin, David Hume. Moral and Political Theorist, oxford-new york, oxford 
university press, 2007, p. 38.
45 postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities”, pp. 160-162.
46 See T 2.1.11.8; SBn 319.
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of ideas’ itself, but it also appears to be a subsidiary element in the Treatise, 
which will eventually be abandoned in the Enquiries47. 
Sympathy may well become an object of analysis for philosophers, who 
seek an order among disparate, succeeding «views and reflections»48; all the 
same, though, it is a plain fact that sympathy is immediately experienced by 
the subject of such views and reflections, and that no analogy with what that 
subject feels is necessary49. as in causality 
when by any clear experiment we have discover’d the causes or effects of any phae-
nomenon, we immediately extend our observation to every phaenomenon of the 
same kind, without waiting for that constant repetition, from which the first idea of 
this relation is deriv’d50
so sympathy functions immediately from the evidence we have of other peo-
ple’s sentiments, prior to any justification we may give of its working. This 
does not mean that inferences as to the characters of persons cannot be 
made on the grounds of their manifest behaviour. This can certainly occur. 
if we wish to justify why it is that, when a certain behaviour presents itself 
in someone, we are ready to declare that this is the expression of a particular 
character trait, we will base our judgement on inference from the behaviour 
to the character. But the point here is that sympathy does not seem to func-
tion in this way, not in the first instance. Sympathy is not a form of argumen-
tation, but a psychological principle that makes explicit a distinctive capacity 
of human beings to identify with the conditions of our fellow humans when 
they express certain emotions. This capacity takes the form of an exercise of 
the imagination that, in the common sentimental nature of the human spe-
cies, is like a coiled spring that never fails to spring open51. 
47 on this point, see Lecaldano, Hume e la nascita dell’etica contemporanea, chs., 1.4 
and 6.5.
48 T 2.1.11.3; SBn 317.
49 on the absence of analogy in hume’s sympathy, see Baier and Waldow, A Conversa-
tion between Annette Baier and Anik Waldow about Hume’s Account of Sympathy, esp. pp. 
70-71. See also hardin, David Hume. Moral and Political Theorist, pp. 34 ff., where humean 
sympathy is described as a direct and nonverbal communication of sentiments. postema, 
“Cemented with Diseased Qualities”, pp. 258-259 maintains that the model of associative 
mechanism of sympathy presented by hume «is an analytical reconstruction, rather than a 
phenomenological description, of the process by which we sympathize with another»; none-
theless, from a phenomenological point of view these various passages result instantaneous, 
automatic and involuntary.
50 T 1.3.15.6; SBn 173-174.
51 See, for example, what hume has to say on the qualities of mind and body in epm 7.2; 
SBn 250-251 and 8.14; SBn 267. according to m. J. Ferreira, Hume and Imagination: Sympa-
thy and the Other, «international philosophy Quarterly», XXXiv (1994), pp. 39-57, sympa-
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if all this is true, then ascribing to hume a problem concerning the exist-
ence of other minds is completely inappropriate. There simply is no ‘problem 
of other minds’ in hume52. The belief in other minds is a natural one which 
is taken for granted from the very beginning, and its origin has to be traced 
back to the primitive experience of the sympathetic contagion. This belief 
doesn’t provide us with a further rational belief in other people’s minds; 
rather, it makes us experience other people’s minds as in tune with our own. 
in this sense, the experience of contagion and the belief in other minds is 
causal, not inferential, and we acknowledge this resemblance among human 
beings well before we are able to conceptualise it53. 
6. For hume, therefore, sympathy is not a defective instrument, reveal-
ing the solipsism to which the individual is destined if one settles for a pas-
sional explanation; on the contrary, it is the key which allows us to establish 
contact with another. This is possible precisely because we are character-
ised by the passional nature that we share, and that renders us responsive 
to emotive stimuli; but this procedure is not reducible to ‘cartesian’ terms 
of interpretation. «The minds of men are mirrors to one another»54, hume 
writes; therefore any explanation that sets out from the single individual 
considered in isolation, in order then to explain how we come to know 
the passions of others is both incorrect and profoundly non-humean. This 
would indeed be a ‘cartesian’ exegesis, and it seems strange that it should 
be attributed to a philosopher for whom Descartes’ work represented a 
negative term of reference55. on the contrary, humean sympathy allows 
thetic communication as described by hume is capable of explaining how our imagination, 
sentimentally connoted, allows us to form representations of others as specific individuals 
who, though similar to ourselves, are not reduced to a mere reflection of ourselves. on this 
point see also c. Swanton, Compassion as a Virtue in Hume, in Feminist Interpretations of 
David Hume, edited by a. J. Jacobson, pennsylvania, The pennsylvania university press, 
2000, pp. 156-173. 
52 This thesis is clearly expressed by a. c. Baier, How to Get to Know One’s Own Mind, 
in Baier, Reflections on How We Live, oxford-new york, oxford university press, 2010, pp. 
128-147. See also Baier, Hume’s Impressions and His Other Metaphors, in Baier, Death and 
Character, pp. 113-146, esp. p. 134. 
53 See postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities”, pp. 160-162. J. p. Wright, Hume’s ‘A 
Treatise of Human Nature’. An Introduction, cambridge, cambridge university press, 2009, 
pp. 212-215, maintains instead the opposite opinion whereby hume, given the associative 
principles on which his philosophy is based, is unable to make sense of our belief in other 
people’s minds and of their independence from our own mind. 
54 T 2.2.5.21; SBn 365.
55 in this connection, see pitson against mercer in Sympathy and Other Selves, and also 
W. D. oliver, A Sober Look at Solipsism, in Studies in the Theory of Knowledge, American 
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for a concept of what it is to be human that does not presuppose something 
hidden that must be discovered, but is rather revealed in the activities in 
which individuals are involved, and in the multiples modes in which they 
react in the presence of others. So if one wished to name a figure reminis-
cent of hume on this issue, Wittgenstein would seem to be a better choice 
than Descartes. as peter F. Strawson notes, «We do not, for example, find 
in Wittgenstein any explicit repetition of hume’s quite explicit appeal to 
nature. But […] the resemblances, and even the echoes, are more strik-
ing than the differences». For both «We simply react to others as to other 
people. They may puzzle us at times; but that is part of so reacting. here 
again we have something which we have no option but to take for granted 
in all our reasoning»56.
«The science of man»57 can therefore be elaborated by means of an 
empirical enquiry that has at its centre human beings as they commonly 
manifest themselves through «a cautious observation of human life», where 
the only admissible experiments are those that «appear in the common 
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their 
pleasures»58. it is only in a context of this kind that the humean principle 
of sympathy acquires significance. adopting the experimental method that 
characterises him, and observing a general, disinterested desire for aggrega-
Philosophical Quarterly, monograph Series, 4, edited by n. rescher, oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1970, pp. 30-39. according to oliver, hume rejects the postulate of privacy that is at the root 
of Descartes’ thought. in hume the problem of solipsism is not given, as it is in Descartes, 
because in hume the notion of a rational ego closed on itself is absent, replaced with that 
of a «natural man», guided by natural beliefs shared with all human beings. it is note-
worthy also that hume’s rejection of solipsism and of the cartesian conception of mind in 
part anticipates Gilbert ryle’s reflections on this problem in The Concept of Mind, London, 
hutchinson, 1949. 
56 p. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism. Some Varieties. The Woodbridge Lectures 
1983, new york, columbia university press, 1985, pp. 14, 21, italics in original. on the af-
finities between the philosophies of hume and Wittgenstein see also o. hanfling, Hume 
and Wittgenstein, in Impressions of Empiricism, edited by G. vesey, London-Basingstoke, The 
macmillan press LTD, 1976, pp. 47-65; p. Jones, Strains in Hume and Wittgenstein, in Hume: 
A Re-evaluation, edited by D. W. Livingston – J. T. King, new york, Fordham university 
press, 1976, pp. 191-209, and Hume’s Sentiments. Their Ciceronian and French Context, edin-
burgh, edinburgh university press, 1982, pp. 176-188; B. Stroud, Hume, London-new york, 
routledge, 1977, ch. 10. Finally, annette c. Baier, in the Preface of her book Postures of the 
Mind. Essays on Mind and Morals, London, methuen, 1985, pp. ix-xiii, declares that it is pos-
sible to discern «a secular Wittgenstenian ethic» in the humean approach to morality, and 
that she wants to build her own philosophy on that line.
57 T intro, para. 4; SBn xv.
58 T, intro, para. 10; SBn xix.
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tion in the majority of living creatures, this is how hume expresses his posi-
tion with regard to humans:
This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who 
has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. 
We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. a perfect solitude is, 
perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. every pleasure languishes when 
enjoy’d a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. 
Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, 
revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would 
they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments 
of others59. 
So when one mentions the experimental method in relation to hume, 
it must be clear that it doesn’t dovetail with, even less can it be reduced to, 
the aims of contemporary experimental psychology. it is true that the sym-
pathetic communication hume talks about finds today experimental confir-
mation, so that hume appears to have anticipated philosophically the ‘mir-
ror neurons’ hypothesis60. But even if the mirror neurons hypothesis lends 
support to the humean notion of sympathy at neurological level, it is worth 
noting that the validity of this principle remains intact in any case – that is 
to say, it is quite independent of scientific verification in terms of the physiol-
ogy of human brain. humean sympathy is the result of a philosophical thesis 
which already finds all the necessary confirmation in the public context of 
the human activities which compose the «common life». it is sufficient to 
observe that sympathy pervades all the relations among «thinking beings». 
neuroscientific evidence is surely welcomed, but is not requisite to deter-
mine the status of humean sympathy: «The best method of reconciling us to 
this opinion is to take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force 
of sympathy thro’ the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of 
sentiments from one thinking being to another»61.
7. There is a further aspect of humean sympathy i would like to remark 
upon. not only does sympathy make us enjoy our pleasures, or suffer our 
pains, more intensely; it also allows us to render passions intelligible to our-
59 T, 2.2.5.15; SBn 363.
60 on mirror neurons, see G. rizzolatti and c. Sinigaglia, So quel che fai. Il cervello che 
agisce e i neuroni specchio, milano, raffaello cortina editore, 2006. on the relevance of mir-
ror neurons for humean sympathy, see Baier, Acting in Character, pp. 4-5; r. hardin, David 
Hume: Moral and Political Theorist, ch. 2.
61 T 2.2.5.15; SBn 362-363.
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selves. our own passional sphere itself acquires definite contours through 
the process of sympathetic exchange. it is not a coincidence, as observed 
above, that hume should present sympathy in the context of the discussion 
of pride and humility; it is in examining these particular passions that the 
constructive role of sympathy becomes evident. When hume describes the 
functioning of pride and humility, he distinguishes between their object and 
their cause62. Their object is the idea of the self, while the causes can be of 
the most varied kinds. What is important is that the causes have some sort of 
correlation with ourselves, and that they give us joy or pain. if that which has 
some relation to us is pleasant, it will generate, when we come to consider it, 
the pleasant passion of pride; if on the other hand it is something painful, it 
will generate the unpleasant passion of humility. in order for this to happen, 
hume further specifies that the causes have to possess precise characteris-
tics: they must be close to the person who is their object, they must not be 
common, but rare, and they must be lasting; but above all, they must be pub-
lic. it is essential that «the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and 
obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. This circumstance 
[…] has an effect upon joy, as well as pride. We fancy ourselves more happy, 
as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others»63. What 
procures pride or humility in ourselves achieves this outcome, not so much 
in being pleasing to us, as by being appreciated or disapproved of by those 
who are close to us. The pleasure or pain that we feel is due, above all, to 
the fact that it receives confirmation in the eyes of those who observe us; or 
better put, we are sensitive to the judgement of those of whom we approve64. 
indeed pride requires the approval of the right people, those whom we our-
selves hold to be worthy of pride because they possess those characteristics 
we consider worthy of admiration. By the same token, what will humiliate us 
is not an abstract judgement, but one proffered by those whose judgement 
we value65. By comparing ourselves to others we acquire the capacity to re-
62 T, 2.1.5.
63 T, 2.1.6.6; SBn 292.
64 in this regard, see D. c. ainslie, Scepticism about Persons in Book II of Hume’s Trea-
tise, «Journal of the history of philosophy», XXXvii (1999), pp. 469-492, and a. o. rorty, 
“Pride Produces the Idea of the Self ”: Hume on Moral Agency, «australasian Journal of phi-
losophy», LXviii (1990), pp. 255-269.
65 See T 2.1.11.12-13; SBn 321-322. on the relation between pride, humility and the 
considerations of others, see p. chazan, Pride, Virtue and Selfhood: A Reconstruction of 
Hume, «canadian Journal of philosophy», XXii (1992), pp. 45-64; J. L. mcintyre, Personal 
Identity and the Passions, «Journal of the history of philosophy», XXvii (1989), pp. 545-
557; e. Lecaldano, The Passions, Character and the Self in Hume, «hume Studies», XXviii 
(2002), pp. 175-193.
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late to persons and to things, and, in this way, we develop those sentiments 
that allow us to find our place in the reality within which we move, and to 
strengthen our consciousness as agents.
The reason for which hume chooses to discuss sympathy alongside pride 
and humility thus becomes clear. The sympathetic mechanism is linked to 
the mechanism that regulates pride and humility in as much as it is an ex-
planatory principle that validates the public nature of these particular pas-
sions, and more broadly, the sentimental nature of human beings in general. 
The idea of a human nature that appears already complete in the single, 
isolated individual is alien to the humean paradigm, and on closer exami-
nation, is not contemplated even by those thinkers who see themselves as 
champions of the substantial individual self. The solitude of the cartesian 
subject is, in reality, very crowded. The crowds include his hypothetical 
cheating demon, and also all those concrete individuals who, in arguing 
with Descartes, contribute with their objections to the elaboration of the 
complex dialogue set out in the Metaphysical Meditations66. The cartesian 
subject does not at all derive the conclusions he expresses on the cogito 
entirely from within himself; instead the operation Descartes presents is 
one that immediately calls on the voices of others. This problem has no 
bearing on hume, who is very much aware that human beings are flesh and 
blood creatures, organised in such a way as to realise themselves fully only 
through a continual passional exchange with others67, and who acquire con-
sciousness of themselves as united and recognisable selves thanks to pride 
and humility68. as postema nicely puts it, «experiences of pride and humil-
ity give the self its determinate shape»69. it is this kind of consciousness 
which underlies the humean notion of virtuous agent, who is none other 
but someone endowed with a ‘moralised’ pride, i.e., someone endowed with 
a stable sense of himself or herself as a single individual who is recognised, 
and positively valued from the common point of view of morality, by those 
66 See a. c. Baier, The Commons of the Mind. The Paul Carus Lectures 19, chicago and 
La Salle, illinois, open court, 1997, and Cartesian Persons, in Baier, Postures of the Mind, 
pp. 74-92; see also a. o. rorty, The Structure of Descartes’ Meditations, in Essays on Descartes’ 
Meditations, edited by a. o. rorty, Berkeley-Los angeles-London, university of california 
press, 1986, pp. 1-20.
67 For a comparison of Descartes’ and hume’s conceptions of the passions in relation 
to the self, see a. o. rorty, From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments, «philosophy», Lvii 
(1982), pp. 159-172.
68 on the importance of pride and humility for the emergence of our self-consciousness 
in hume, see L. Greco, L’io morale. David Hume e l’etica contemporanea, napoli, Liguori, 
2008, ch. 5.
69 postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities”, p. 268. 
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around him or her70. as there could not be any experience of pride and hu-
mility without sympathy, so the consciousness of our self which results from 
these passions would never come to be defined in the absence of others. 
This is the dynamic whereby a progression71 is enabled, leading from emo-
tive contagion to that «extensive sympathy»72 which is the cornerstone of 
hume’s ethics. What hume has achieved by these means, is a philosophical 
perspective which at the same time places individuals at its centre, without 
denying their crucial connection to each other73. 
70 on the notion a moralised pride, see a. c. Baier, Master Passions, in Explaining Emo-
tions, edited by a. o. rorty, Berkeley-Los angeles-London, university of california press, 
1980, pp. 403-423; J. a. herdt, Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy, cambridge, 
cambridge university press, 1997, chap. 2; a. o. rorty, The Vanishing Subject: The Many 
Faces of Subjectivity, «history of philosophy Quarterly», XXiii (2006), pp. 191-209.
71 See a. c. Baier, Sympathy and Self-Trust, in Baier, Reflections on How We Live, pp. 
189-215; postema, “Cemented with Diseased Qualities”, pp. 260-262.
72 See T 3.3.1.23; SBn 586.
73 an earlier version of this paper was presented at the rome humean readings in June 
2004, and it is now part of ch. 8 of my book L’io morale. i would like to thank the audience 
of the conference, and especially mattia Bilardello, caterina Botti, roger crisp, piergiorgio 
Donatelli, peter Kail, eugenio Lecaldano, emanuele Levi mortera, Jane mcintyre, Gian-
franco pellegrino, Sara protasi, peter railton, Barry Stroud and alessio vaccari for their 
very useful comments. 
